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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to address the delicate balance 
between federal and state authority established under the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.  The Health 
Maintenance Organization of New Jersey ("HMO/NJ") appeals from 
the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants 
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Christine Todd Whitman, the Governor of New Jersey, Elizabeth 
Randall, the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of 
Insurance, and Charles Wowkanech, the Chairman of the New Jersey 
Individual Health Coverage Program (collectively, "the State"). 
The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether the Federal 
Employee Health Benefits Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901, et. seq. 
("FEHBA") preempts certain provisions of the New Jersey Health 
Insurance Reform Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 17B:27A-2 - 27A-16.4 (the 
"Reform Act").  HMO/NJ argues that the premium assessments under 
the Reform Act are preempted by FEHBA because they will increase 
the cost of individual health care benefits to federal employees, 
benefits which are payable from the Federal Employee Health 
Benefits Fund.  We agree.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
hold that section 8909(f) of FEHBA preempts premium assessments 
under the Reform Act when applied to insurance plans governed by 
FEHBA, and will reverse the district court's order on the issue 
of FEHBA preemption. 
I. 
A. 
 In response to this nation's growing health care 
crisis, New Jersey enacted the Reform Act to ensure that all its 
citizens would receive the benefits of individual health care 
coverage.  (Individual health care coverage is coverage offered 
by an insurance company or health maintenance organization 
directly to an individual and his or her family.  By increasing 
the availability of individual health care coverage, the State 
intends to reduce the number of uninsured self-employed or 
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unemployed residents, who often do not have the option of 
purchasing employer-based or group health coverage).   
 Under the Reform Act, a non-compensated, nine-member 
Board of Directors "shall establish the policy and contract forms 
and benefit levels to be made available" under an Individual 
Health Coverage Program.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-7.  In 1993, 
the Board of Directors devised a program whereby state residents 
would be offered five standardized individual health plans.1  The 
program requires New Jersey health insurance companies and health 
maintenance organizations (collectively referred to in the Reform 
Act as "carriers") to offer state residents the five standardized 
policies as a condition of continuing to issue any type of health 
benefit plans in the state.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17B:27A-4, 
17B:27A-(a)(3)(c).  Carriers were required to start offering the 
five plans on August 1, 1993. 
 The central component of the Reform Act is the 
requirement that all carriers in the state pay an "assessment" 
                     
1
 The five standardized plans are intended to offer residents 
a range of coverage with varying co-payment levels and a choice 
of deductibles.  These plans are guaranteed, which ensures that 
an eligible applicant (in general, one is eligible for a 
standardized plan if unable to procure group coverage, Medicare, 
or Medicaid) will not be denied coverage.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§17B:27A-6(a).  The plans are also "community rated," so that a 
carrier must offer a standard plan to everyone at the same rate 
regardless of the applicant's age, gender, profession, health 
status, or place of residency within the state.  See id.  If an 
uninsured resident applies for one of the standard plans, and 
that applicant has a pre-existing health condition, the carrier 
is allowed to deny coverage for the preexisting condition for one 
year, but thereafter must cover all conditions.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 17B:27A-7(b).  With the goal of making the individual policy 
market a competitive one, the State does not regulate the rates 
charged by carriers for the five plans. 
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that is used to defray financial losses incurred by those 
companies that provide a disproportionate share of the "higher-
risk" individual health insurance coverage in the state.  In 
group health plans, the cost of insuring higher-risk people, 
individuals who require expensive medical treatment, is spread 
among the entire insured population.  In contrast, when people 
are individually insured, these costs must be borne by either the 
individual or the insurance company.  As a result, insurance sold 
on an individual basis may be prohibitively expensive for the 
consumer and unprofitable for the insurance company.  Through the 
assessment, the Reform Act attempts to spread the cost of 
insuring higher-risk individuals among New Jersey's entire 
insurance industry in order to reduce the cost to the individual 
while increasing the profitability of insuring those individuals. 
 New Jersey carriers are required to "pay or play" with 
respect to the individual health insurance market.  For each 
carrier, the Board establishes a target goal of individual 
policies, or more specifically "non-group" policies, that the 
carrier must issue in a calendar year if it wishes to obtain an 
exemption from the assessment.  In general, a carrier's target 
number of non-group policies for the exemption is calculated 
based on the carrier's proportion of the overall state-wide 
health coverage market.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-12(d)(3). 
 The State pools the money collected pursuant to the 
annual assessment and uses it to reimburse carriers who suffer 
losses in the individual insurance market during the calendar 
year.  The assessment is calculated as the proportion of the 
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carrier's "net earned premium" for the calendar year preceding 
the assessment in relation to the net earned premium of all 
carriers for the calendar year preceding the assessment.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-12(a)(2).  The Reform Act uses a carrier's 
net earned premium as a proxy for the carrier's market share.  A 
simplified example would be if a carrier earned 15% of all health 
insurance premiums in New Jersey, then it would be assessed 15% 
of the total losses incurred by carriers issuing individual 
policies.  The "net earned premium" is all premiums earned in New 
Jersey by a carrier on any of its health benefit plans, including 
"the aggregate premiums earned on the carrier's insured group and 
individual business and health maintenance organization 
business[.]"  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-2.  Notably, premiums 
from self-insured plans administered by a carrier are not 
included in the assessment calculation.  In addition, carriers 
are assessed their proportion of the administrative expenses 
incurred by the Individual Health Coverage Program. 
§ 17B:17A-11(a). 
B. 
 FEHBA provides health benefits for federal employees, 
their families, and federal retirees.  See 5 U.S.C. § 8901 et 
seq.  The program is administered by the Office of Personnel 
Management ("OPM"), which is authorized to negotiate contracts 
with qualified carriers for the provision of health benefits to 
federal employees and other enrollees.  Premiums for enrollment 
in a health plan are set annually and determined in OPM's 
contract negotiations with each participating carrier. 
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 The costs of enrolling in a health plan are paid by 
contributions from the enrollee and the federal government.  The 
government's share is equal to 60% of the average premium charged 
by major participating health plans and may not exceed 75% of the 
total charge for enrollment.  5 U.S.C. § 8906.  The balance of 
the enrollment charge is paid by the enrollee and withheld from 
the enrollee's salary or retirement annuity.  These contributions 
are then paid into a specifically-designated account in the 
United States Treasury:  the Employee Health Benefits Fund (the 
"Fund").  5 U.S.C. § 8909.  Payments and reimbursements to 
participating insurance carriers are then made from the Fund. 
 As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, Pub.L. 101-508, Congress amended FEHBA by adding subsection 
8909(f) which provides that: 
(1)  No tax, fee, or other monetary payment 
may be imposed, directly or indirectly, on a 
carrier or an underwriting or plan 
administration subcontractor of an approved 
[FEHBA] health benefits plan by any State 
* * * or by any political subdivision or 
other governmental authority thereof with 
respect to any payment made from the Fund. 
 
(2)  Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to 
exempt any carrier underwriting or plan 
administration subcontractor of an approved 
health benefits plan from the imposition, 
payment, or collection of a tax, fee, or 
other monetary payment on the net income or 
profit accruing to or realized by such 
carrier or underwriting or plan 
8 
administration subcontractor from business 
conducted under [FEHBA], if that tax, fee, or 
payment is applicable to a broad range of 
business activity. 
5 U.S.C. 8909(f). 
C. 
 HMO/NJ, a wholly owned subsidiary of U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., is a health maintenance organization licensed by New Jersey 
to provide health care benefit plans to employers and individuals 
in the state.  Specifically, HMO/NJ also has a contract with the 
federal government to provide health care benefits to federal 
employees and federal enrollees who select HMO/NJ as their 
provider.  For the 1992 calendar year, HMO/NJ was assessed 
$429,783 under the Reform Act's premium assessment program.  The 
total 1992 assessment for all program members was $2,613,005. 
HMO/NJ paid its assessment, and it did not receive a 1992 
reimbursement under the assessment program.  In 1993, HMO/NJ paid 
an assessment of $6.4 million, again without receiving a 
reimbursement under the program.  Like other carriers, HMO/NJ 
began to issue the five standardized plans on August 1, 1993.  In 
1993 to qualify for an exemption from the assessment HMO/NJ's 
target number of non-group policies was 10,000; as of 
December 27, 1993, HMO/NJ had issued only 428 non-group member 
policies.  In contrast, to compensate for losses on its 
individual policies during that year, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
New Jersey received a 1993 program reimbursement of approximately 
$54 million. 
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 The Reform Act's assessment provision is at the heart 
of HMO/NJ's preemption claim.  HMO/NJ claims that "as a result of 
having to pay into the premium assessment program, without 
receiving any of the proceeds therefrom, HMO/NJ has been forced 
to include a provision in its rates to subscribers -- principally 
private sector employee benefit plans and federal employee plans 
-- to cover the cost of the premium assessment."  See Appellant's 
Brief p.12 (emphasis added).  A direct result of the 1993 
assessment has been that HMO/NJ increased the cost of health care 
benefits to its subscribers by "about one percent."  As a result, 
HMO/NJ argues that "[t]he assessment is . . . a state imposed 
tax, fee or monetary payment on FEHBA plans.  Accordingly, it 
falls within the realm of FEHBA preemption."  Id., p.16. 
 HMO/NJ filed a lawsuit in the federal district court 
for the District of New Jersey asserting that the State's premium 
assessment program is preempted by both the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act ("ERISA") and by 5 U.S.C. § 8909(f) of FEHBA. 
Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court 
held that neither federal statute preempted the relevant 
provisions of the Reform Act.  (For the purposes of this appeal 
our review is limited to the issue of FEHBA preemption).  The 
court concluded that FEHBA did not preempt the State scheme 
because the statute itself allows states to impose assessments 
"applicable to a broad range of business activity," 5 U.S.C. 
§ 8909(f)(2), and the New Jersey statute fell within this savings 
provision because the state law "does not specifically target 
FEHBA plans."  The Health Maintenance Organization of New Jersey 
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v. Christine Todd Whitman, No. 93-5775, slip op. at 8 (D. N.J. 
Oct. 3, 1994).  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this matter 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.3  Our review of the district court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary, Public Interest Research of N.J. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990); Wheeler 
v. Towanda Area School Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir. 1991), 
as is our review of all questions of law.  Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994). 
III. 
 Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, 
federal law preempts state law "either by express provision, by 
implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law." New 
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995).  In other 
words, "[w]here a state statute conflicts with or frustrates 
federal law, the former must give way."  CSX Transportation v. 
Easterwood, 123 L.Ed.2d 387, 396 (1993).  In order to avoid an 
unintended encroachment on state authority, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that when interpreting a federal statute, courts 
                     
2
 "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States."  28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
3
 "The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the 
United States . . ."  28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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should be reluctant to find preemption.  Id. at 396; Travelers, 
115 S. Ct. at 1676.  Instead, we begin with the presumption that 
Congress does not intend to preempt state law.  Travelers, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1676.  State law will only be preempted when it is the 
"clear and manifest purpose of Congress."  CSX, 123 L.Ed.2d at 
396 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947)); Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1676; Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617-18 (1992); Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 472 U.S. 724, 740 (1985). 
 To determine Congress' intent, we begin with the text 
of the statute in question, and then move on to "the structure 
and purpose of the Act in which it occurs."  Travelers, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1677.  As the Supreme Court has stated: 
If the statute contains an express pre-
emption clause, the task of statutory 
construction must in the first instance focus 
on the plain wording of the clause, which 
necessarily contains the best evidence of 
Congress' preemptive intent. 
CSX, 123 L.Ed.2d at 396.  If Congressional intent is unclear, 
however, courts should defer to an implementing agency's 
interpretation of the statute, as long as that interpretation is 
reasonable.  See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("[I]f the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.").  With these 
principles in mind, we conclude that Congress intended to preempt 
state law in this instance. 
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A. 
 The plain language of subsection 8909(f)(1) of FEHBA 
preempts the New Jersey Reform Act's premium assessment.  In 
interpreting any statute, we begin with the plain language of the 
statute itself.  Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 
U.S. 827, 835 (1990); In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 
1995) ("[W]e begin with the familiar canon that the starting 
point for interpreting a statute is its plain language.") (citing 
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 588 (1989)); Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1237 (3d Cir. 
1995).  While the expression "plain language" may in certain 
instances be an oxymoron, In re Segal, 57 F.3d at 346, unless 
there is a clear expression of legislative intent to the 
contrary, Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 835, "courts must presume that a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a 
statute what it says."  Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. 
Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). 
 Title 5 of the United States Code, at section 
8909(f)(1) provides that: 
(1)  No tax, fee, or other monetary payment 
may be imposed, directly or indirectly, on a 
carrier or an underwriting or plan 
administration subcontractor of an approved 
[FEHBA] health benefits plan by any State 
* * * or by any political subdivision or 
other governmental authority thereof with 
respect to any payment made from the Fund. 
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5 U.S.C. 8909(f).  Under section 8909(f)(1), state regulation is 
preempted if it is (1) a state or local tax, fee, or other 
monetary payment; (2) imposed directly or indirectly on a 
carrier; and (3) with respect to payments made from the Employee 
Health Benefits Fund.  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 
708, 715 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a state surcharge on 
hospital rates was preempted by both ERISA and FEHBA), reversed 
on other grounds, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) 
(holding that ERISA did not preempt the state surcharge). 
Although there is no dispute that the premium assessment 
satisfies the second criteria, the state argues that the 
assessment does not meet the first and third criteria. 
 The State argues that the Reform Act's premium 
assessment is not preempted by section 8909(f)(1) for two 
reasons.  First, the State argues that Congress only intended 
FEHBA preemption to apply to "premium taxes," and that the 
premium assessment cannot be considered a premium tax because it 
is "apportioned on the basis of market share, not premiums." 
(Appellees' Br. at 42) (emphasis in original).  (Premium taxes 
are defined as those taxes "imposed on FEHB premiums by any State 
. . ."  48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-71 (1992)).  The State's argument is 
based on language in the statute's legislative history4 as well 
                     
4
 H.R. No. 101-881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 173 reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2181 ("exempts the FEHB from state premium 
taxes"); H.R. No. 101-881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 176 reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2184 ("This state premium tax exemption is 
intended to be similar in nature and application to the existing 
premium tax exemptions applicable to the Employee's Life 
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as its title in section 7002(c) of OBRA ("EXEMPTION FROM STATE 
PREMIUM TAXES").  Second, the State argues that even if the 
assessment falls within section 8909(f)(1)'s definition of "tax, 
fee, or other monetary payments," it is not made "with respect to 
any payment from the fund."  (Appellees' Br. at 42-43). According 
to the State, the premium assessment simply represents a general 
cost of doing business.  The fact that this cost is passed on to 
FEHBA enrollees is a purely voluntary decision made by the 
carrier.  Neither the Reform Act nor its implementing regulations 
mandate such a result.  In presenting these arguments, the State 
argues that we must reject the Second Circuit's reasoning in 
Travelers. 
 We find these arguments unpersuasive.  By its terms, 
section 8909(f)(1) prohibits the imposition of taxes, fees, or 
other monetary payments.  The plain language of the statute is 
therefore not limited to "premium taxes," and the assessment 
clearly falls within the definition of a "fee" or "other monetary 
payment."  As a result, the only genuine question is whether the 
premium assessment program is imposed "with respect to any 
payment from the Fund."  Contrary to the State's position, OPM's 
interpretation of the statute and the statute's general 
legislative history support a broad interpretation of the 
statute's third criterion.  Because the Second Circuit addressed 
                                                                  
Insurance Fund, as set forth in section 8714 of title 5, United 
States Code."); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2184, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2374, 2681 ("the 
conference agreement includes the House and Senate provisions 
. . . exempting the FEHBP from State premium taxes"). 
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these very same issues and we agree with its reasoning in 
Travelers, we will discuss the decision in greater detail. 
 In facts very similar to those before us, the Second 
Circuit in Travelers concluded that FEHBA preempted several New 
York hospital surcharges.  In its effort to contain health care 
costs and guarantee the availability of hospital insurance 
coverage to needy New Yorkers, New York enacted three hospital 
surcharges.  New York Public Health Law § 2807-c(1)(b) required 
insurance carriers other than Blue Cross & Blue Shield, an HMO, 
or a government insurance such as Medicaid, to pay a 13% 
surcharge directly to the hospital.  New York Public Health Law 
§ 2807-c(11)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1993) required an additional 11% 
surcharge charged to patients covered by commercial insurance, 
and New York Public Health Law § 2807-c(2-a)(a) (McKinney Supp. 
1993) required an assessment of up to 9% on HMOs which failed to 
enroll a target number of Medicaid-eligible persons.  The 
proceeds from the 11% and 9% surcharges were paid into a 
statewide pool, and subsequently ended up in the State's general 
fund.  Travelers, 14 F.3d at 712.  The court found that the 
primary purpose of the 11% surcharge was to increase the cost of 
commercial insurance thereby making Blue Cross & Blue Shield more 
competitive, while the purpose of the 9% surcharge was to 
"encourage HMOs to enroll Medicaid recipients, thereby lowering 
the costs of the Medicaid program."  Id.  Like the New Jersey 
Reform Act's premium assessment, the overall purpose of these 
surcharges was to spread the cost of insuring individuals who are 
unable to obtain individual health care insurance.  The Second 
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Circuit found that the New York surcharges were preempted under 
ERISA and FEHBA.  (The Supreme Court granted certiorari only on 
the issue of ERISA preemption and reversed the Second Circuit in 
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995)). 
 In addressing the issue of FEHBA preemption, the court 
found that the plain language of section 8909(f)(1) preempted New 
York's surcharges, and that this conclusion was consistent with 
OPM's interpretation of the statute as well as the Act's overall 
purpose of reducing government expenditures.  In Travelers, the 
appellants, like the State in this action, argued that FEHBA 
preemption was limited to "premium taxes."  In rejecting this 
position, the court stated that "[t]o adopt the defendants' 
crabbed view of preemption would undermine" the revenue-saving 
purpose of section 8909(f)(1), FEHBA, and OBRA in general.  14 
F.3d at 716.  The court then concluded that "[b]ecause payments 
from the Fund are directly affected by what the hospitals charge 
for their services, and because the surcharges increase the 
amounts carriers draw from the Fund, the surcharges are clearly 
imposed `with respect to . . . payment[s] made from the Fund.'" 
Id.  We agree. 
 As mentioned earlier, the plain language of section 
8909(f)(1) prohibits the imposition of taxes, fees, or other 
monetary payments.  Section 8909(f)(1) clearly states that "[n]o 
tax, fee, or other monetary payment may be imposed . . ."  The 
language used in the statute makes no reference to "premium 
taxes," and provides no indication that the statute is limited to 
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that particular form of tax.  Interpreting the plain language of 
the statute, we conclude that Congress intended to preempt the 
imposition of any tax, fee, or monetary payment on FEHBA carriers 
with respect to payments from the Fund. 
 Even if we were to find that the statute's language is 
ambiguous, based upon the statute's legislative history and 
administrative regulations our conclusion would be the same. 
Although the statute's legislative history does occasionally use 
the term premium taxes, see supra note 4, the same legislative 
history describes section 8909(f) as exempting FEHBA from "any 
tax, fee, or other monetary payment . . ."  H.R. No. 101-881, 
p.176, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 2184.  According to OPM, 
the phrase "premium taxes" represents a shorthand reference to 
the more cumbersome clause itself.  See Travelers, 14 F.3d at 
717.  As a result, OPM interprets the statute as follows:  "[t]he 
prohibited payments, referred to elsewhere in these regulations 
as `premium taxes,' applies to all payments directed by States or 
municipalities, regardless of how they may be titled, to whom 
they must be paid, or the purpose for which they are collected 
. . ."  48 C.F.R. § 1631.205-41 (emphasis added).  Given the 
statute's plain language, OPM's interpretation of the statute is 
reasonable and compels us to reject the State's narrow reading of 
FEHBA's preemption provision.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  See 
also Louisiana Public Service Com. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 
(1986) ("[A] federal agency acting within the scope of its 
congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state 
regulation."); Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La 
18 
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (valid federal regulation 
intended to displace state law has no less preemptive effect than 
a federal statute); Freehold Cogeneration Associates v. Board of 
Regulatory Comm'rs of the State of New Jersey, 44 F.3d 1178, 1190 
(3d Cir. 1995) ("Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, a federal agency acting within the scope of its 
congressionally delegated authority has the power to preempt 
state regulation and render unenforceable state or local laws 
which are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law.").5 
 The interpretation of "with respect to any payment made 
from the Fund" is a slightly harder question.  Neither the 
statute or the legislative history defines this specific 
criterion.  Once again, however, OPM's regulations provide us 
with guidance.  According to OPM, section 8909(f)(1)'s 
prohibition applies to "all forms of direct and indirect 
measurements on FEHBP premiums, however modified . . ."  48 
C.F.R. § 1631.205-41.  The court in Travelers understood this to 
include any direct or indirect tax that resulted in increased 
payments from the Fund.  14 F.3d at 716.  As discussed earlier, 
FEHBA participants and the federal government contribute payments 
to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund.  Carriers like 
HMO/NJ who have a contract with the federal government to provide 
health benefits coverage are paid for their services directly 
from the Fund.  5 U.S.C. § 8909(a)(1) (premium contributions to 
                     
5
 There is no dispute that OPM is vested with the authority 
to administer, oversee, and promulgate regulations for the FEHBA 
program.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8902, 8909(a) and 8913. 
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the Fund are available for all payments to approved health 
benefits plans); 48 C.F.R. § 1632.170(a) ("OPM will pay to 
carriers of community-rated plans the premium payments received 
for the plan . . . .  Premium payments will be due and payable no 
later than 30 days after receipt by the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits (FEHB) Fund.").6  Given this payment scheme, the Reform 
Act's premium assessment is imposed "with respect to any payment 
made from the fund" because the amount OPM must pay to HMO/NJ is 
based on HMO/NJ's premiums which have increased in part as a 
result of the premium assessment.  Because payments from the fund 
are directly affected by what HMO/NJ charges for its services, 
and the premium assessment increases the amount OPM must pay from 
the Fund, New Jersey's premium assessment are imposed "with 
respect to . . . payment[s] made from the Fund."   Although this 
may be characterized as an indirect imposition because the 
increased payment is based upon HMO/NJ's voluntary decision to 
pass the costs of the premium assessment along to FEHBA plans, 
the plain language of FEHBA section 8909(f)(1) unequivocally 
                     
6
 HMO/NJ's plans are community rated plans.  "Community rate 
means a rate of payment based on a per member per month 
capitation rate or its equivalent that applies to a combination 
of the subscriber groups for a comprehensive medical plan."  48 
C.F.R. § 1602.1702(a).  The plans addressed in Travelers were 
experience-rated plans whose contribution rates "are based on the 
plan's actual paid claims, administrative expenses, and other 
allowable `retentions.'"  14 F.3d at 715-716 n.2 (citing 48 
C.F.R. § 1602.170-6 (1992)).  Although both types of plans 
receive funds directly from the Fund, their methods of payment 
are differ.  Community rated plans have their premiums paid 
directly from the Fund, 48 C.F.R. § 1632.170(a), while experience 
rated plans must draw against letter-of-credit accounts on a 
"checks presented" basis.  48 C.F.R. § 1632.170(b). 
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preempts indirect as well as direct taxes, fees, or other 
monetary payments, 5 U.S.C. § 8909(f)(1) ("No tax, fee, or other 
monetary payment may be imposed, directly or indirectly . . .") 
(emphasis added). 
 Our interpretation of FEHBA section 8909(f)(1) is 
consistent with the Act's overall purpose.  The general purpose 
of the FEHBA program is to: 
protect federal employees against the high 
and unpredictable costs of medical care and 
to assure that federal employee health 
benefits are equivalent to those available in 
the private sector so that the federal 
government can compete in the recruitment and 
retention of competent personnel. 
National Federation of Federal Employees v. Devine, 679 F.2d 907, 
913 n.9 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (quoting AFGE v. Devine, 525 F. Supp. 
250, 252 (D. D.C. 1981)).  FEHBA section 8909(f) was enacted in 
1990 to achieve budgetary savings without sacrificing the quality 
of health care protection provided by FEHBA or impairing the 
government's ability to attract and retain talented personnel. 
See H.R. No. 101-881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 173, 181 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2181, 2190.  It was passed in 
response to a U.S. General Accounting Office report indicating 
that the government could cut costs by exempting FEHBA carriers 
from state taxes.  See United States General Accounting Office, 
Federal Compensation:  Premium Taxes Paid by the Health Benefits 
Program, GAO/GGD 29-102 (August 8, 1989) (Joint Appendix at 530). 
According to the legislative history, the savings presumably 
would "result from reduced program costs which in turn reduce the 
employer premiums the Government pays."  H.R. No. 101-881, 101st 
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Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2198. 
The New Jersey assessment, which increases the cost of providing 
health care to the federal government and its employees, 
frustrates these congressional objectives.  Based upon the plain 
language of the FEHBA preemption statute, OPM's implementing 
regulation, and the federal policies and objectives underlying 
the statute's enactment, we conclude that the New Jersey Reform 
Act's assessment scheme is preempted by FEHBA section 8909(f)(1). 
Having reached this conclusion, we now address whether the scheme 
is nonetheless "saved" by FEHBA section 8909(f)(2). 
B. 
 FEHBA section 8909(f) is best understood as Congress' 
effort to exempt FEHBA plans from certain generally applicable 
laws.  We must interpret section 8909(f)(2) in order to determine 
the scope of that exemption.  FEHBA section 8909(f)(2) provides: 
Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to 
exempt any carrier underwriting or plan 
administration subcontractor of an approved 
health benefits plan from the imposition, 
payment, or collection of a tax, fee, or 
other monetary payment on the net income or 
profit accruing to or realized by such 
carrier or underwriting or plan 
administration subcontractor from business 
conducted under [FEHBA], if that tax, fee, or 
payment is applicable to a broad range of 
business activity. 
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5 U.S.C. 8909(f)(2) (emphasis added).  In other words, a tax, 
fee, or other monetary payment that would otherwise be preempted 
under subsection 8909(f)(1) is "saved" if it is "applicable to a 
broad range of business activity."  In upholding the New Jersey 
scheme, the district court concluded that the premium assessment 
was applicable to a broad range of business activity.  The court 
reasoned that "for FEHBA plans to be exempt from state-imposed 
premium taxes, the state tax must be specifically levied against 
the FEHBA plan."  The Health Maintenance Organization of New 
Jersey v. Christine Todd Whitman, No. 93-5775, slip op. at 8 (D. 
N.J. Oct. 3, 1994).  We disagree. 
 The plain language of the statute requires a more 
expansive exemption for FEHBA plans.  According to section 
8909(f)(2), states are preempted from imposing any tax, fee, or 
other monetary payment on carriers of FEHBA plans except those 
taxes, fees, or other monetary payments that are "applicable to a 
broad range of business activity."  By definition, "broad range" 
is synonymous with "wide range" or "extensive" business 
activities.  See The Random House College Dictionary 171 (Rev. 
ed. 1982); Webster's New World Dictionary 176 (3d ed 1988) 
(broad:  "wide in range; not limited").  If Congress had intended 
only to preempt taxes specifically targeting FEHBA plans, it 
would have said so expressly.  Instead, the statute's language 
reflects an intent to exempt FEHBA plans from all taxes and fees 
except those generally applicable to other commercial industries. 
 In addition to the plain language of the statute, our 
interpretation is justified by the statute's underlying purpose. 
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As discussed earlier, FEHBA section 8909(f) was enacted as a cost 
saving measure.  If we were to accept the district court's 
interpretation of subsection 8909(f)(2), it would render all of 
section 8909(f) superfluous.  The Constitution itself prohibits 
states from specifically targeting the Federal Government and 
Federal programs.  Under the Supremacy Clause, "state taxes on 
contractors are constitutionally invalid if they discriminate 
against the Federal Government, or substantially interfere with 
its activities."  United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735, 
n.11 (1982).  A statute preempting such action is therefore 
unnecessary, and if subsection 8909(f)(2) was intended to preempt 
only state taxes specifically targeting FEHBA plans, FEHBA 
section 8909(f) as a whole would not save the Federal Government 
any money because those taxes are already prohibited by the 
Constitution. 
 The district court's narrow interpretation would also 
undermine one of the statute's specific objectives - exempting 
FEHBA plans from state premium taxes.  As the State has 
consistently argued, FEHBA section 8909(f)(1) was enacted to 
exempt FEHBA plans from state premium taxes.  (As we discussed 
earlier, section 8909(f) exempts other taxes, fees, and monetary 
payments as well).  Because premium taxes do not specifically 
target FEHBA plans, under the district court's interpretation, 
they would be saved from preemption by section 8909(f)(2).  This 
result is clearly inconsistent with one of the statute's 
principal goals, and must be rejected.  The goal of preempting 
state premium taxes also guides our interpretation of what 
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Congress considered "a broad range of business activity." Because 
premium taxes are applicable to the entire insurance industry, it 
would appear that a tax, fee, or other monetary payment is 
imposed on "a broad range of business activity" when, at the very 
least, it applies to more than a single industry.  A less 
inclusive definition, like the one adopted by the district court, 
would permit states to impose a tax that Congress specifically 
meant to preempt.  Given Congress' objective, a tax applicable to 
only a single industry like insurance, banking, or real estate, 
cannot be treated as applying to a broad range of business 
activity.  At the very least, the tax must apply to more than a 
single industry or business activity. 
 The New Jersey Reform Act's premium assessment scheme 
is not imposed on "a broad range of business activity."  Unlike a 
state premium tax, the Reform Act's premium assessment is not 
even imposed on the insurance industry as a whole.  The 
assessment "applies only to the health insurance business and, 
even within that limited field, carves out a list of health 
insurance activities that are not subject to the statutory levy." 
(United States as Amicus Curiae, Br. at 16).  The New Jersey 
statutory scheme excludes certain accident policies, Medicare 
coverage, and other types of insurance plans that offer health 
benefits.  See N.J.S.A. § 17B:27-A-2.  As such, the premium 
assessment is imposed on a rather limited range of business 
activity, and is not saved by subsection 8909(f)(2). Accordingly, 
the Reform Act's premium assessment scheme is preempted as 
applied to FEHBA plans.  We hasten to add, however, that we hold 
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only that FEHBA preempts New Jersey's premium assessment scheme 
as applied to FEHBA plans.  We do not hold that the Reform Act's 
assessment provisions are preempted or inapplicable to all of the 
insurance activities of carriers like HMO/NJ. 
IV. 
 Although we hold that FEHBA preempts the New Jersey 
Reform Act's premium assessment program as applied to FEHBA 
plans, we are compelled to note that we are somewhat troubled 
that our ruling today impedes the State's legitimate effort to 
reform the existing health care system and provide needed health 
care coverage to all its citizens.  We are mindful that Congress' 
failure to reform the provision of health care at the national 
level has increased the need for a state by state resolution of 
this problem.  Until Congress amends FEHBA, however, our decision 
is dictated by the plain language of the statute, its legislative 
history, and the Act's overall purpose.  We cannot grant the 
states authority which Congress, in a legitimate exercise of its 
authority, specifically denied.  Accordingly, the district 
court's order with respect to FEHBA preemption will be reversed. 
 In view of our conclusions, the district court's order 
with respect to FEHBA preemption will be reversed.  We will 
remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings 
to fashion a remedy.  In this regard we note that in its amicus 
curiae brief the United States suggests a method to implement a 
holding that the Reform Act is preempted with respect to FEHBA 
policies.  On the remand the district court should consider this 
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proposal as well as any other suggestions the parties may make to 
give effect to this opinion. 
